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LIST OF EXHIBITS 
Hearing Transcript taken on March 12, 2012 will be lodged with the Supreme Court: 
Exhibits admitted into record before Idaho Department of Labor 
1. Notice of Telephone Hearing, mailed February 27, 2012 (3 pages) 
2. Important Information about your Hearing Read Carefully (2 pages) 
2b Unemployment Insurance Claimant Benefit Rights, Responsibilities and Filing 
Instructions (35 pages) 
3. Claim Summary December 13, 2011 (5 pages) 
3a. Claim Summary February 22, 2012 (6 pages) 
4. IVRU Reports December 27, 2010 (52 pages) 
5. TALX memo January 11, 2012 (5 pages) 
6. Quit-Claimant Statement No date submitted (3 pages) 
7. TALX documents January 26, 2012 (7 pages) 
8. Eligibility Determination Unemployment Insurance Claim January 8, 2012 (2 pages) 
9. Eligibility Determination Unemployment Insurance Claim February 8, 2012 (3 pages) 
10. Determination of overpayment February 8, 2012 (1 page) 
11. Explanation of improper payment February 8, 2012 (3 pages) 
12. Appeal of Determination (Eligibility) February 22, 2012 (8 pages) 
12a. Written warning- Job performance and Poor leadership October 26, 2010 (3 pages) 
13. Appeal of Determination (False statement) February 22, 2012 (8 pages) 
13a. Written warning- Job performance and Poor leadership October 26, 2010 (3 pages) 
14. Employer's Data February 24, 2012 (1 page) 
15. Benefit payment history February 24, 2012 (5 pages) 
16. Overpayment data February 24, 2012 (9 pages) 
LIST OF EXHIBITS - (Bringman, SC # 40232) - (i) 
APPEALS BUREAU 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
317 WEST MAIN STREET I BOISE, IDAHO 83735-0720 
(208) 332-3572 / (800) 621-4938 
BILLY J BRINGMAN, 
SSN:
Claimant 
vs. 
NEW ALBERTSONS INC, 
Employer 
and 
FAX: (208) 334-6440 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) DOCKET NUMBER 2865-2012 
) 
) DECISION OF APPEALS EXAMINER 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
) 
) 
) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-) 
DECISION 
Benefits are DENIED effective December 5, 2010. 
The employer's account is NOT CHARGEABLE on the claim. 
The Eligibility Determination dated February 8, 2012, which concluded that the claimant quit his 
job without good cause connected with the employment, is hereby AFFIRMED. · 
Benefits are DENIED effective December 5, 2010 through December 3, 2011, and effective 
December 11, 2011 through January 14, 2012. The claimant is also NOT ELIGIBLE for 
benefits effective February 5, 2012 through February 2, 2013. · 
The Eligibility Determination dated February 8, 2012, which concluded that the claimant 
willfully made a false statement or failed to report a material fact on his claim, is hereby 
AFFIRMED. 
Waiver of the requirement that the claimant repay benefits owed to the Employment Security 
Fund is NOT GRANTED. 
HISTORY OF THE CASE 
The above-entitled matter was heard by Thomas J. Holden, Appeals Examiner for the Idaho 
Department of Labor, on March 12, 2012, by telephone in the City of Boise, in accordance with 
§72-1368(6) ofthe Idaho Employment Security Law. 
The claimant, Billy Bringman, participated in the hearing and was represented by C. Tom Arkoosh. 
DECISION OF APPEALS EXAMINER - 1 of 6 
The employer, New Albertsons Inc., was represented in the hearing by Frank Eckert. Shane Wright 
participated in the hearing as a witness for the employer. 
The respondent, the Idaho Department of Labor, was represented in the hearing by Elaine Mattson. 
ISSUES 
The issues before the Department are whether unemployment is due to the claimant quitting 
voluntarily and, if so, whether with good cause connected with the employment -OR- being 
discharged and, if so, whether for misconduct in connection with the employment, according to 
§72-1366(5) of the Idaho Employment Security Law, whether the employer's account is properly 
chargeable for experience rating purposes for benefits paid to the claimant, according to 
§72-1351(2)(a) of the Idaho Employment Security Law, whether the claimant willfully made a 
false statement or representation or willfully failed to report a material fact in order to obtain 
unemployment insurance benefits, according to §72-1366(12) of the Idaho Employment Security 
Law, and whether the claimant has received benefits to which s/he was not entitled, and if so, 
whether the requirement to repay benefits owed to the Employment Security Fund may be 
waived, according to §72-1369(5) of the Idaho Employment Security Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Based on the exhibits and testimony in the record, the following facts are found: 
I. The claimant worked as an assistant store director for Albertsons from May 12, 2004, 
through December 4, 2010. 
2. The employer received a complaint that the claimant provided poor customer service. 
The claimant refused to accept a check from a regular customer. 
3. On October 26, 2010, the employer gave the claimant a write-up over the incident. The 
claimant refused to sign the write-up because he believed that the write-up would be used 
against him in the future. The employer sent the claimant home. 
4. When the claimant returned to work several weeks later, the claimant met with the vice 
president of human relations, Shane Wright. Mr. Wright informed the claimant that he 
could either resign and accept a· severance package, or he would be demoted and 
transferred to another store. 
5. The claimant chose to resign and accept the severance package. 
6. The claimant reported to the Department of Labor that the reason for his separation was 
due to laid off/lack of work. 
7. In the first four of the five calendar quarters preceding the one in which the claimant 
applied for benefits, this employer paid the claimant more wages than any other 
employer. 
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AUTHORITY 
Section 72-1366(5) of the Idaho Employment Security Law provides in pertinent part that a 
Claimant is ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits if the claimant voluntarily quit 
without good cause connected with employment or was discharged for misconduct in connection 
with employment. 
If an employee voluntarily quits employment, the burden is on the employee to prove that it was for 
good cause. Pyeatt vs. Idaho State Univ., 98 Idaho 424, 565 P.2d 1381 (1977). The Idaho Supreme 
Court adopted the definition of "good cause" in Burroughs vs. Employment Sec. Agency, 86 Idaho 
412, 387 P.2d 473 (1963): 
In order to constitute good cause, the circumstances which compel the decision to leave 
employment must be real, not imaginary, substantial, not trifling, and reasonable, not 
whimsical; there must be some compulsion produced by extraneous and necessitous 
circumstances. The standard of what constitutes good cause is the standard of 
reasonableness as applied to the average man or woman and not to the supersensitive. 
Ibid at p. 414. Thus, purely personal reasons are not "good cause" for quitting a job. Moreover, 
when an employee has viable options available to him or her, voluntary termination without 
exploring those options does not constitute good cause for obtaining unemployment compensation. 
Ellis vs. Northwest Fruit & Produce, Inc., 103 Idaho 821, 654 P.2d 914 (1982). This requirement 
stems from the policy of the law to encourage employers and employees to adjust their differences 
and avoid interrupting employment. Hart vs. Deary High School, 126 Idaho 550, 552, 887 P.2d 
1057, 1059 (1994) 550, 553 887 P.2d 1057, 1060. 
Section 72-1351(2)(a) of the Idaho Employment Security Law provides in part that for 
experience rating purposes, no charge shall be made to the account of such covered employer 
with respect to benefits paid to a worker who terminated his services voluntarily without good 
cause attributable to such covered employer, or who had been discharged for misconduct in 
connection with such services. 
Section 72-1366(12) of the Idaho Employment Security Law provides that a claimant shall not 
be entitled to benefits for a period of fifty-two (52) weeks if it is determined that he has willfully 
made a false statement or willfully failed to report a material fact in order to obtain benefits. The 
period of disqualification shall commence the week the determination is issued. The claimant 
shall also be ineligible for waiting week credit and shall repay any sums received for any week 
for which the claimant received waiting week credit or benefits as a result of having willfully 
made a false statement or willfully failed to report a material fact. The claimant shall also be 
ineligible for waiting week credit or benefits for any week in which he owes the department an 
overpayment, civil penalty, or interest resulting from a determination that he willfully made a 
false statement or willfully failed to report a material fact. 
"Willfully" implies simply a purpose or willingness to cominit the act or make the omission 
referred to. It does not require any intent to violate law, in the sense of having an evil or corrupt 
motive or intent. It does imply a conscious wrong, and may be distinguished from an act 
maliciously or corruptly done in that it does not necessarily imply an evil mind, but is more 
nearly synonymous with "intentionally," "designedly," and therefore not accidental. Meyer vs. 
Skyline Mobile Homes, 99 Idaho 77, 589 P.2d 89 (1979). 
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A finding that a benefit claimant knew or thought it highly probable that he or she did not know 
what information a question solicited but nevertheless deliberately chose to respond without 
pursuing clarification would ordinarily support a conclusion of willful falsehood or concealment 
Meyer vs. Skyline Mobile Homes, 99 Idaho 77, 589 P.2d 89 (1979). 
Section 72~1369(5)(a) of the Idaho Employment Security Law provides: (5) The director may 
waive the requirement to repay an overpayment, other than one resulting from a false statement, 
misrepresentation, or failure to report a material fact by the claimant, and interest thereon, if: (a) 
the benefit payments were made solely as a result of department error or inadvertence and made 
to a claimant who could not reasonably have been expected to recognize the error. 
In order for repayment of an erroneously paid benefit to be waived, the claimant must show: 
(1) that such payments were not the result of a false statement, misrepresentation or 
concealment of a material fact by the claimant 
(2) that such payments were made solely.as a result of department error or inadvertence; and, 
(3) that such payments were made to a claimant who had no way of knowing that he [or she] 
was receiving benefits to which he [or she] was not entitled. Blayney vs. City of Boise, 
110 Idaho 302, 307, 715 P.2d 972, 977 (1986) 
CONCLUSIONS 
The claimant quit his job after the claimant was given a write-up that he disagreed with. The 
claimant could have continued in his position by signing the write-up. While the claimant may 
have disagreed with the write-up, it has not been established that the employer's request was so 
unreasonable or burdensome that the claimant's most prudent recourse was to quit his job. The 
claimant did not quit his job with good cause connected with the employment. Therefore, the 
claimant is ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits, and the employer's account is not 
chargeable on the claim. 
The claimant reported to the Department of Labor that the reason for his separation from 
Albertsons was due to laid of£1lack of work There have been no facts presented which would 
support a conclusion that the claimant was laid off or that there was a lack of work. The 
claimant has not provided a reasonable explanation for failing to provide accurate information to 
the Department of Labor. It must be concluded that the claimant willfully made false statements 
or representations or willfully failed to report material facts in order to obtain unemployment 
insurance benefits. Therefore, the claimant is ineligible for benefits, and the claimant does not 
meet the criteria for a waiver of the requirement that the claimant repay benefits owed to the 
Employment Security Fund. 
Date of Mailing Last Day To Appeal 
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APPEAL RIGHTS 
You have FOURTEEN (ill DAYS FROM THE DATE OF MAILING to file a written appeal with 
the Idaho Industrial Commission. The appeal must be mailed to: 
Or delivered in person to: 
Or transmitted by facsimile to: 
Idaho fudustrial Commission 
Judicial Division, IDOL Appeals 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0041 
Idaho Industrial Commission 
700 S Clearwater Lane 
Boise, ID 83712 
{208) 332-7558. 
If the appeal is mailed, it must be postmarked no later than the last day to appeal. An appeal filed 
by facsimile transmission must be received by the Commission by 5:00 p.m., Mountain Time, on 
the last day to appeal. A facsimile transmission received after 5:00 p.m. will be deemed received by 
the Commission on the next business day .. A late appeal will be dismissed. Appeals filed by any 
means with the Appeals Bureau or a Department of Labor local office will not be accepted by the 
Commission. TO EMPLOYERS WHO ARE INCORPORATED: Ifyoufile an appeal with the 
Idaho Industrial Commission, the appeal must be signed by a corporate officer or legal counsel 
licensed to practice in the State of Idaho and the signature must include the individual's title. The 
Commission will not consider appeals submitted by employer representatives who are not attorneys. 
If you request a hearing before the Commission· or permission to file a legal brief. you must make 
these requests through legal counsel licensed to practice in the State of Idaho. Questions should be 
directed to the Idaho Industrial Commission, Unemployment Appeals, (208) 334·6024. 
If no appeal is filed, this decision will become final and cannot be changed. TO CLAIMANT: If 
this decision is changed, any benefits paid will be subject to repayment. If an appeal is filed, you 
should continue to report on your claim as long as you are unemployed. 
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APPEALS BUREAU 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
317 WEST MAIN STREET I BOISE, IDAHO 83735-0720 
(208) 332-3572 / (800) 621-4938 
FAX: (208) 334-6440 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on /11bJt4 ef-31 :JDl1- , a true and correct copy of Decision of Appeals Examiner was served by regular United States mail upon each of the 
following: 
BILLY I BRINGMAN 
10618 W PATTIE ST . 
. BOISE ID 83713 
NEW ALBERTSONS INC/ T ALX UC EXPRESS 
P 0 BOX 173860 
DENVER CO 80217-3860 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR-BOISE 
CLAIM DIVISION ATTN: OFFICE MANAGER 
219 WMAIN ST 
BOI E ID 83735-0030 
CAPITOL LAW GROUP PLLC 
ATTN: C. TOM ARKOOSH 
P OBOX2598 
BOISE ID 83701-2598 
DECISION OF APPEALS EXAMINER - 6 of 6 
04/05/2012 15:21 20842 4 
C. Tom Arkoosh, ISB # 2253 
CAPITOL LAW GROUP, PLLC 
250 North l 0th Street, 4th t<'loor 
P.O. Box 2598 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2598 
Telephone: (208) 424-8872 
Facsimile: (208) 424-8874 
CAPITOL LAW 
Attorney for Billy l Bringman 
APPEALS BUREAU 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
IP 
BILLY J. BRINGMAN, 
SSN
Docket No. 2865-2012 
Claimant, 
PAGE 01/02 
vs. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL OF APPEALS 
EXAMINER DECISION 
NEW ALBERTSONS INC., 
Employer 
and 
lDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
COMES NOW, Claimant, Billy J. Bringman, by and through his counsel of record, 
Capitol Law Group, PLLC, and hereby files a Notice of Appeal in reference to the Decision of 
Appeals Examiner filed on March 23~ 2012. Claimant requests an agency record be prepared by 
the agency, and the Commission consider written bri.efing thereon. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED. 
NOTICE OP APPEAL OF APPEALS EXAMINER DECISION· Page I 
04/05/2012 THU 18: 28 [TX/RX NO 8:335] 14J 001 
04/05/2012 15:21 208424 4 CAPITOL LAW IP PAGE 02/02 
,.,...-
DATED this _:i_ day of April, 2012. 
CAPITOL LAW GROUP~ PLLC 
By: ·~ -----~-·~---· ----·-···--
C. Torn Arkoosh, Of the Finn 
Attorneys for Billy J. Bringman 
CERTIFlCATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __ day of April, 2012, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document on the person(s) listed below, i11 the manner indicated: 
Idaho Department of Labor 
Appeals Bureau 
317 W. Main St. 
Boise, ID 83735 
U.S. Mail, postage prepa.icl 
Overnight Courier 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile 332-7558 
C. To.ni-Arkoosh-v==· 
NOTICE OF APPEAL OF APPEALS EXAMINER DECISION - Page 2 
04/05/2012 THU 18: 28 [TX/RX HO 8:335] ~ 002 
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER, GOVERNOR 
April 10, 2012 
New Albertsons, Inc. 
C/O TALX UC Express 
PO Box 173860 
Denver, CO 80217-3860 
POBox83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0041 
(208) 334-6000 - FAX (208) 334-2321 
1-800-950-2110 
RE: Billy New Albertsons, Inc. 
SS #
IDOL# 2865-2012 
Dear Talx UC Express Representative: 
COMMISSIONERS 
Thomas E. Limbaugh, Chainnan 
Thomas P. Baskin 
R.D. Maynard 
Mindy Montgomery, Director 
The Idaho Industrial Commission received an appeal in the above entitled unemployment insurance 
case. According to the Idaho Department of Labor Appeals Examiner's Decision, you represented 
the employer in this matter prior to this appeal. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-1323, Rule 4 of the Rules of Appellate Practice and Procedure under 
the Idaho Employment Security Law, effective as amended March 1, 2009, and Idaho Supreme 
Court case law (White v. Idaho Forest Industries, 98 Idaho 784, 572 P.2d 887 (1977); Kyle v. Beco 
~. 109 Idaho 267, 707 P.2d 378 (1985)), the Idaho Industrial Commission cannot allow third-
party, non-attorney representation of an employer in these matters. Consequently, you will not be 
served with any additional information related to this appeal. 
The Commission does not have a current mailing address for the employer. Please inform your 
client that if they want to receive documentation related to this appeal or otherwise participate in the 
appeal process, they must provide the Commission with their mailing address, in writing, or appear 
before the Commission through an attorney licensed to practice law in the state ofldaho. " 
Assistant Commission Secretary 
cc: 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
STATE HOUSE MAIL 
317 W MAIN STREETBOISE ID 83735 
CAPITOL LAW GROUP PLLC 
ATTN: C TOM ARKOOSH 
PO BOX2598 
BOISE, IDAHO 83701-2598 
700 So. Clearwater Ln., Boise, ID 
Equal Opportunity Employer 
•. · 
... 
:it 
~ ·. ~~. 
·:: 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BILL , 
SSN:
Claimant, 
V. 
IDOL 2865-2012 
NEW ALBERTSONS, INC., 
Employer, 
NOTICE OF FILING 
OF APPEAL 
and 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: The Industrial Commission has received an appeal from a 
decision of an Appeals Examiner of the Idaho Department of Labor. A copy of the appeal is 
enclosed, along with a copy of the Commission's Rules of Appellate Practice and Procedure. 
PLEASE READ ALL THE RULES CAREFULLY 
The Industrial Commission promptly processes all unemployment appeals in the order 
received. In the mean time, you may want to visit our web site for more information: 
www.iic.idaho.gov. 
The Commission will make its decision in this appeal based on the record of the 
proceedings before the Appeals Examiner of the Idaho Department of Labor. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS DIVISION 
POST OFFICE BOX 83 720 
BOISE IDAHO 83720-0041 
(208) 334-6024 
Calls Received by the Industrial Commission May Be Recorded 
NOTICE OF FILING OF APPEAL - 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 10111 day of April, 2012 a true and correct copy of the Notice 
of Filing of Appeal and compact disc of the Hearing was served by regular United States mail 
upon the following: 
APPEAL AND DISC: 
CAPITOL LAW GROUP PLLC 
ATTN: C TOM ARKOOSH 
PO BOX 2598 
BOISE, IDAHO 83701-2598 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
STATE HOUSE MAIL 
317 W MAIN STREET 
BOISE ID 83735 
aas 
NOTICE OF FILING OF APPEAL - 2 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRAIG G. BLEDSOE ISB# 3431 
TRACEY K. ROLFSEN - ISB# 4050 
CHERYL GEORGE- ISB# 4213 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Idaho Department of Labor 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 73 5 
Telephone: (208) 332-3570 ext. 3148 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BILLY J. BRINGMAN, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
NEW ALBERTSONS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. 
) 
) 
) 
) IDOL NO. 2865-2012 
) 
) 
) NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
~~~~~~~~~-) 
TO THE ABOVE-NAMED PARTIES: 
Please be advised that the undersigned Deputy Attorney General representing the 
Idaho Department of Labor hereby enters the appearance of said attorneys as the 
attorneys of record for the State of Idaho, Department of Labor, in the above-entitled 
proceeding. By statute, the Department of Labor is a party to all unemployment 
insurance appeals in Idaho. 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - 1 
DATED this~_ day of April, 2012. 
Tracey K. / I} sen 
Deputy Att©flley General 
Idaho Department of Labor 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEARANCE, 
was mailed, postage prepaid, this ~-day of April, 2012, to: 
C TOM ARKOOSH 
PO BOX2598 
BOISE ID 83701 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - 2 
NEW ALBERTSONS INC 
C/O TALX UC EXPRESS 
PO BOX 173860 
DENVER CO 80217-3860 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BILLY J. BRINGMAN, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
NEW ALBERTSONS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. 
IDOL # 2865-2012 
ORDER DENYING NEW HEARING; 
ORDER ESTABLISHING BRIEFING 
SCHEDULE 
Claimant, Billy J. Bringman, through counsel, appealed a Decision issued by an Idaho 
Department of Labor ("IDOL") Appeals Examiner finding: 1) Claimant voluntarily quit his job 
without good cause connected with the employment, 2) Employer's account is not chargeable for 
experience rating purposes, 3) Claimant willfully made a false statement or failed to report a 
material fact in order to obtain; and 4) Claimant was not entitled to a waiver of the requirement 
that he repay benefits owed to the Employment Security Fund. Claimant requests a new hearing 
to provide oral argument as well as the opportunity to submit a brief in this matter. (Claimant's 
appeal, filed April 5, 2012). 
New Hearing to Submit Oral Argument 
Idaho Code § 72-1368(7) grants the Commission authority to "in its sole discretion, 
conduct a hearing to receive additional evidence or may remand the matter back to the appeals 
examiner for an additional hearing and decision" if the interests of justice so require. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has consistently upheld that it is within the Commission's sole discretion to 
determine whether to consider additional evidence and that those decisions will not be overturned 
absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion. Appeals Examiner of Idaho Department of Labor 
v. J.R. Simplot Co., 131Idaho318, 955 P.2d 1097 (1998). According to Rule 7(B) of the Rules of 
ORDER DENYING NEW HEARING; ORDER ESTABLISHING BRIEFING SCHEDULE 
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Appellate Practice and Procedure under the Idaho Employment Security Law ("R.A.P.P."), 
effective as amended, January 1, 2012, a party requesting to offer additional evidence shall submit, 
among other requirements, the "reason for requesting a hearing." A party seeking to provide oral 
argument based on the record as it stands must present some justification for that request. 
Unemployment insurance appeals are adjudicated under the principles and procedures of 
administrative law. Hearings at this level of review are not a matter of right, as in other forums. 
Claimant requests a new hearing in order to submit oral argument. (Claimant's request). 
Upon review, the Commission finds it is unnecessary to delay this matter further to hold a hearing 
for oral argument. Claimant received ample opportunity to present argument in this matter. Prior 
to the hearing, the Appeals Bureau advised both parties of the issue and the importance of 
presenting all relevant evidence to the Appeals Examiner. (Exhibits 1 & 2). Claimant was 
represented by counsel at the hearing and received a full and fair opportunity to present its case to 
the Appeals Examiner. The record is this matter is sufficient. Furthermore, Claimant did not set 
forth any reason for his request as is required by the R.A.P .P. Without argument from Claimant, 
the Commission is without a basis with which to determine whether a new hearing is warranted. 
The Commission takes the position that conducting a new hearing at this level of review is 
an extraordinary measure and should be reserved for those cases when due process or other 
interests of justice demand no less. No such circumstances exist here. Claimant received 
adequate due process and ample opportunity to present his case in this matter. Claimant's request 
for a new hearing to provide oral argument is DENIED. 
BRIEFING SCHEDULE 
In lieu of an opportunity for a new hearing, the Commission grants Claimant's request to 
submit a brief pursuant to Rule 5(A) of the R.A.P.P. The parties may prepare written argument 
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based on the evidentiary record as it stands. Any inclusion of, or comment on, additional evidence 
in a brief will not be considered by the Commission. All briefs must comply with the R.A.P.P., a 
copy of which the Commission supplied to the interested parties with the Notice of Appeal. 
The Commission establishes the following briefing schedule: 
Claimant's brief will be due ten (10) days from the date of this Order. 
Employer, through counsel, and the Idaho Department of Labor may reply within seven (7) 
days of the receipt of Claimant's brief, if they so choose. 
DATED this~y 2012. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
,;/ 
'.',,,, A,,,,y CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I her~by '~~~ify that on th _,.....1mf!iay of LWJ (/fl { , 2012, a true and correct copy of 
Order Denying New Hearing; ~ ~:;ablisirllJrBriefing Schedule was served by regular 
United States mail upon each of the following: 
CAPITOL LAW GROUP PLLC 
ATTN: C TOM ARKOOSH 
PO BOX2598 
BOISE, IDAHO 83701-2598 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
STATE HOUSE MAIL 
317 W MAIN STREET 
BOISE ID 83735 
JS 
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I C. Thomas Arkoosh 
Group, PLLC \VWW .capitollawgroup.com • talrkoosh@oapitollawgrou-p.com 
VIA F AC SIM.ILE 332-7558 
Thomas .L Holden, Appeals Examiner 
Idaho Industrial Commission 
Judicial Division, IDOL Appeals 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0041 
April 30, 2012 
Re: Bringman v. Albertson and IDOL 
Docket No: 2865-2012 
CLG File No. 6413.000 
Dear Mr. Holden: J 
This office received from the Department of Labor's Appeals E aminer, an audio 
recording of the hearing. Because, to my knowledge, there is no written t't'a script, I have cited 
to points in time in the audio transcript in the Memorandum filed herewith. I 
If there is any question regarding these citations, please contact m~ offi.ce using the 
information in the above letterhead. 
CTA:lbt 
Enclosures 
Sincerely, 
Capitol Law Group, PLLC 
C. Thomas Arkoosh 
205 N. JO'h S!rnr.:t, 4th Floor, PO Box 2:598, Boise, ID 8370 I ·2598 • Tel: (208) 424-8872 • F:,ix; (208) 424-8874 
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C. Torn Arkoosh, ISB # 2253 
CAPITOL LAW GROUP, PLLC 
250 Nm1h 10th Street, 4th Floor 
P.O. Box 2598 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2598 
Telephone: (208) 424-8872 
Facsimile: (208) 424-8874 
Attorney for Billy J. Bringman 
CAP ITDL LAt\i GR"' 'P 
APPEALS BUREAU 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
BILLY J. HRlNC1M1\N, 
SSN
Claimant~ 
Docket No. 2865-2012 
PAGE 02/14 
vs. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
NOTICE OF APPEAi., 
NEW ALBERTSONS INC.> 
Employer 
and 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
This Memorandum in Support of Noti.cc of Appeal is filed on behalf of Bllly J. Bringman 
("Bringman") in :>upport of his Notice of Appeal. filed April 5, 2012. 
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
1. Bringman worked for Albcrtsons from 2004, not long after his return from active 
combat duty in Tra.g, until November. l l, 2010. 
2. Albcrtsons check policy requires that store employees see customer identification 
prior to accepting checks from customers as payment for purchases at the store. On October 5, 
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2011, a customer tTied to purchase groceries from the Albertsons store at which Bringman 
worked without identification. Pursuant to Albe1.isons policy, Bringman did not accept the 
customer's check without identification. 
3. On October 26, 2010, an Albertsons store director issued Bringman a written 
warning for poor performance and poor leadership skills relating to the customer check issue. 
Because Bi;ngman followed company policy in not accepting the check, Bringman refused to 
s1gn the warning. Following his refusal. to sign the warning, the store director sent Bringman 
home until further notice. 
4. After three weeks away from work pursuant to the store director's instruction, 
Albertsons called Bringman to a rneeting with Shane Wright, Vice President of Albertsons 
("Wright"). At that meeting, Wright presented Bringman with two options- First, Bringman 
could resign and accept a severance package and Albcrtsons would not contest any fi]jng for 
unemployment benefits_ Alternatively~ Wright told Bringman he could stay with the company~ 
but that Albcrtsons's would transfer him, demote him from his title of Assistant Store Director to 
a subordinate title, and pay him $13.50 per hour~ approximately $20,000 Icss than he was paid 
prior to his mandatory leave, and approximately half of his salary of $46,000 prior to leave. 
Bringman accepted the severance package. 
5. On December 5, 2010, Bringman filed with the Idaho Department of Labor ("the 
Department") for unemployment benefits and b<;:gan receiving benefits thereafter until December 
5, 201 l. The Department's on.line application for unemployment benefits offers three choices to 
describe an applicanf s termination: I) Quit, 2) Terminated, or 3) Laid-off due to Jack of work. 
The application sets forth no option for constructive discharge. On both his December 2010 
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application and his December 2011 reapplication for unemployment benefits, Bri.ngn1an selected 
"Jaid-offdue to Jack of work" as his cause of termination. 
6. Albertsons did not respond or ol~ject to Bringman's first application for 
unemployment benefits. 
7. The Department responded to Bringrnan's December 2011 reapplication with tvvo 
Determinations of Overpayment ("Determinations"), stating that Bringman ''did not provide 
accurate separation infom1ation in an attempt to obtain benefits 1o which he was not entitled" and 
quit his position without exploring the options that were available to him. 
8. Bringman appealed the Department's Determinations) and on March 12~ 2012,, a 
hearing was held in front of the Department's Appeals Examiner ("Examiner'')-
9. At the hearing, Wright testified that Albcrtsons tenuinated Bringman due to 
problems with Bringman's performance, following the write~up, that were reported to Wright on 
a "phone call [he] received from the store director Audrey and the district manager Tim 
Johnson'', further asserting that Bringman' s termination had nothing to do with the write-up 
following the check incident, but, rather, "continuing problems and issues that had happencd .... i' 
Audio Recording at 57:10. Wright went on to testify that Bringman, following the write-up, 
" ... had made it worse in the store.') Audio Recording at 57:26. During further testimony, 
Wright agreed that the write-up was titled «Last and Final Warning". Further, whei1 asked 
whether Bringman returned to the store following that write-up, Wright answered that Bringman 
had returned to the store; but that he did not have personal knowledge of this fact and would not 
"get into details as to why rhe) didn't have that information in front of [him]". Audio Recording 
at 59:29. Bringman testified that he, in fact, did not retum to work following the write-up. No 
corporate records were produced as direct evidence to conflict with Bringman's testimony. 
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l 0. At that hearing; Elaine Mattson of the Idaho Department of Labor ("Mattson'') 
questioned Bringman regarding whether ''there was work available" and whether he was "laid 
off for Jack of work'~. Audio Recording at I: l 0:52_ Bringman answered that he had been told 
his only option besides severance was to accept a position with inferior duties to the one he held 
and that offered compensation of approximately half of what he earned at the time of the write-
up. Mattson asked Bringman, then, whether there was any other work he could do for. 
Albcrtsons. Bringman responded that by her de llnition of "any work'; there was some other 
work available. The Examiner dee.lined to include in his Findings of Fact any details regarding 
the employment offered to Mr. Bringman. 
11. At the bearing, Bringman testified that he left his employment for good cause. 
Mattson agreed in her testimony that "left his employment voluntarily without good cause 
connected with his employment, or that he was discharged for misconduct in connection with h.i.s 
employment" is the language of the statute applicable to claimant eligibility for uncmploymeut 
compensation. However, when claimant's counsel C. Torn Arkoosh ("Arkoosh") questioned Ms. 
Mattson regarding whether there was a prohibition keeping the Department from using the 
language of the statute in the on line questionnaire, Mattson answered that there was not When 
Arkoosh asked whether using the langt1age of the statute might make the questionnaire clearer, 
Mattson answered, "No. That's why we do the fact finding .... '' Audio Recording at 1: 14:25. 
However~ immediately following this statement, Mattson acknowledged that, contrary to her 
statement immediately prior, there is no "fact-finding drop-down'' in the screen immediately 
following this questionnaire_ Aud1o Recording at I: 14:28. In response to further questioning, 
Mattson then asserted that, although the fact finding she had described did not take place, that 
this problem could not have been rcso.lved by the questionnaire because, "Laid off due to Jack of 
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work is exactly what it means - laid off due to .lack of work. You don't need to explain laid off 
due to lack of work." Audio Recording at l: 14:47. Denying the lack of clarity in the 
questionnaire that led to the hearing, Mattson asserted that " . .,we' re having a discussion a.bout 
whether or not the claimant voluntarily quit his job ... .'' Audio Recording at l :15:05. Mattson 
offered no explanation as to why clearer statutory language is not used in the questionnaire. 
12. In her testimony, Mattson repeatedly referred to Bringman's "separation", a te11n 
used in neither the applicable statute nor the online questionnaire but that> in addjtion to "quit'), 
"terminated" and "laid off'' makes four different possible descriptions for an employee's lcaviiig 
his employment. In her testimony, Mattson stated that Bringman should have chosen "a choice 
with a separation", however, when asked if there was an option representing "a choice with a 
separation" in the online questionna.irc, she states that, in order to choose snch an option for 
separation, Bringman would have had to select "quit" or "terminated". Audio Recording at 
I :02:43. Manson offored no explanation, however, for how a clajmant should make the 
connection between "separationj' and ('quit" or "terminated~~. Following up on her assert.ion 
regarding "separation'\ Mattson stated that, ('Bottom line for the Department is that~ whether 
[Bringman] quit or was fired, it doesn't matter, it's splitting hairs. There was a separation." 
Au1do Recording at 1:03:39. 
13. When, in further inquiring as to ways to make the questionnaire clearer, Arkoosh 
asked if the state agreed or disagreed that it should supply a line item for "termination without 
cause'', Mattson answered "disagree". Audio Recording at l: 17:07. When, following that 
response, Arkoosh asked Mattson whether ~'if a person feels that they had to quit for abuse, say, 
ot sexual harassment they're supposed to put quit?'~ Mattson responded "That is correct." 
Audio Recording at l: 17:20. 
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14. Jn the findings of fact, the appeals examiner states that 
"On October 26, 2012, the employer gave the claimant a write-up over the 
incident. The claimant refused to sign the write-up because he believed that the 
write-up would be used again,;it him in the future." 
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The Examiner's conclusion directly contradicts Bringman's testimony, in which he stated that he 
refused to sign the write-up because "l would have been signing a document saying I had done 
something vvrong, when in actuality l was following company po.licics and procedures .... " 
Audio Recording at 14:15. Bringman's testimony goes on to describe the contrast between the 
w-ritc-up and the Albertsons policy sfa.tement 
15. The Exarn.iner concluded that "There have been no facts presented which would 
support a conclnsicm that the claimant was laid off or that there was a lack of work." 
APPLICABLE LAW 
An employer constmctivdy discharges an employee when the employer makes working 
conditions unendurable, resu]ting in the employee's reasonable decision to resign. Waterman v. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 201 P.3d 640, 645 (Idaho 2009). 
A claimant has good cause to voluntary leave his employment where 
''the circumstances which compel the decision to leave employment [arc] reaL 
not imaginary, substantial, not trifling, and reasonable, not whimsical; there must 
be some compulsion produced by extraneous and necessitous circumstances, and 
the standard of what constitutes good cause is the standard of reasonableness as 
applied to the average man 01- woman." 
Jensen v. Siemsen, l l 8 Idaho 1 ~ 4, 794 P.2d 271, 274 (1990). 
Idaho Code§ 72-1366 sets forth the requirements an applicant must meet in order to be 
eligible for unemployment compensation. Jn particular, LC§ 72-1366(5) allows a claimant to 
rcce1ve compensation where 
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"The claimant's unemployment is not due to the fact that he left bis employment 
voluntarily without good cause connected with his ernployment, or that he was 
discharged for misconduct in connection with his employment." 
A finding that a benefit claimant knew or thought it highly probable that he or she did not 
know what information a question solicited but nevertheless deliberately chose to respond 
whhout pursuing clarification woulcl ordinarily support a conclusion of willful falsehood or 
concealment See A1eyer v. SA.yline Mobile Homes, 99 Idaho 754, 589 P.2d 89 (1979). 
A daimant acts willfully if he or she "purposely, intentionally, consciot1sly, or knowingly 
fails to report material facts." ld. at 96-97. Willful implies simply a purpose or willingness to 
commit the act or make the omission referred to. It does not require any intent to violate law .... " 
Current v. l!addons Fencing, Inc., 152 Idaho 10, 13-14, 266 P.3d 485~ 488~89 (2011 ). However, 
willfulness does not include accidental omissions due to "negligence, misunderstanding or other 
cause." Id. 
Idaho Code § 72-1366( 12) states "A claimant shall not be entitled to benefits for a period 
of fifty-two (52) weeks if it is determined that he has willfully made a false statement or willfully 
failed to report a material fact in order to obtain benefits." 
ARGUMENT 
I. Albcrtsons Constructively Oischargcd Bringman. 
16. An employer constructively discharges an employee when the en1ploycr makes 
working conditions unendurable, resulting in the cmployee;s reasonable decision to resign. 
Waterman, 201 P.3d at 645. Albcrtsons asked Bringman to sign a document by which it asked 
hiru to falsely admit to disobeying compa.ny policy. In Conclusions, the Exa111iner begins his 
analysis by writing, "The claimant quit his job after the claimant was given a write-up that he 
disagreed with." However~ the vvrite-up Al.bertsons gave Bringman states that Bringman 
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"fail[cd] to follow division standards, policies and practices .... " See "Exhibit A" to Bringman's 
"Appeal of Determination (False Statement)". However, when Bringman refused to accept the 
disgruntled customer's personal check he did so in accordance with the company policy .in effect 
at that time, which ordered store c:mployees to "Verify ID on all personal check systern 
prompts .. .''. ld. TI1e Examiner is correct in stating that Bringman disagreed with the write-up, 
but failed to take that reasoning to its logical end, which is that the write-up was factually 
incorrect and signing it would have been the equivalent for Bringman of betraying his personal 
integrity. 
l 7. When Bringman declined to sign the document containing the misrcprcsentatio:ns 
regarding store policy and his actions, Albcrtsons ordered Bringman not to come to work for 
approximately three weeks beginning in October 20 l 0. Because he did not hear from Albcrtsons 
during th1s period, Bringman had to contact Albertsons numerous times to inquire regarding the 
status of his employment Each time Bringman contacted Albertsons, Albertsons informed him 
that it was still contemplating the situation. Thereafter, Albcrtsons gave Bringman the choice to 
resign or take a substantial cut i11 pay, approximately half of his salary, and move to another store 
location. By threatening to demote Bringman for his refusal to sign a false document, Albertsons 
forced Bringman to resign from his employment and thereby constructively discharged him. 
18. Therefore, the Exarn.incr's next conclusion is also incorrect. While the Examiner 
concludes that "it has not been established that the employer's request was so unreasonable or 
burdensome that the claimant's most prudent recourse was to quit his job", Albertsons ordered 
Bringman to take mandatory leave after he refused to affinn Albertsons lie. To ask a combat 
veteran whose career has been bi1ilt on the foundation of his personal integrity and ability to 
follow orders to tie and then to punish him when he refuses to do so is sufficiently outrageous to 
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cause such a veteran to leave his employment. Contrary to the Department's statement in its 
Determination, Bringman had no '"viable" options available to him because no :reasonable person 
would willingly take a substantial cut in pay in exchange for being forced to sign a false 
document. 
19. In her hear1ng testimony, Mattson represented that so long as any other work is 
available, a claimant has not been discharged. This is not an accurate statement of the law of 
constructive discharge. \Vhilc Albe1isons offered Bringman other work, the work it offered was 
sig11ificantly less desirable than the work he was doing, and was offered in exchange for far less 
pay. While Mr. Bringman earned approximately $46,000 at his position prior to the write-up, 
Albe11sons offered him only $13.50 per hour, approximatel.y half that amount, following the 
10.·Titc-up. While Mattson is correct that there was work available at Albertsons~ asking Bringman 
to lie by signing a false write-up and then demoting him made his working conditions 
unendurable, resulting in his reasonable decision to leave Albertsons employ. While the 
Examiner inexplicably conclttded that "There have been no facts presented which would support 
a conclusion that the clahnant was laid off or that there was a lack of work"~ throughout the 
hearing Bringman testified to Albcrtsons informing him that it had no more of his work available 
to him, at one point testifying that Wright informed him that the "only available position is this 
position that fthey offered h.im]" Audio Recording at 28: 19 (emphasis added). While, in his 
situation, "laid off' was constructive discharge, or, in the lexicon of the statute, leaving for 
"good cause'\ "laid off" is not in the statute, and there was neither an option fm ' 4good cause" 
nor constructive discharge in the onlinc questionnaire. 
II. Bringman Truthfullv and in Good Faith Reported to the Department All 
Material Facts with Regard to l:lis Unemployment Insurance Claim. 
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20. Idaho Code Section 72-13 66(12) states that a claimant is not entitled to 
unemployment benefits where that claimant willfully makes a false statement or willfully fails to 
report a material fact in order to obtain benefits, A claimant ha& a duty to pursue clarification 
where the cla1mant knows or finds it highly probable that he or she does not know what 
information a question sohcits. Meyer) 589 P.2d at 97. 
21. Following his constructive discharge frorn. Albertsons, Bringman applied for 
benefits using the Department's online questionnaire, and so had only three options from which 
to choose to describe his termination: l) "Quit", 2) "Terminated", or 3) «Laid-off dt1c to lack of 
work". Bringman selected "laid-off due to lack of work", the description he, in good faith, 
believed best described his termination, as he did not leave h.is employment voluntarily without 
good cause and Albertsons did not terminate him for misconduct, which was his understanding 
of the meaning of the other two options. Further, AJbe1tsons, by pressuring him to sign a false 
VVTite-up that misrepresented his actions and then offering him a severe and unwarranted 
demotion, had given Bringman the impression that it had no more work for hirn similar to the 
work he had been performing. Thus, when examining 111e mere three choices offered hitn on the 
online questionnaire with no opportunity to add narrative explanation for his choice, nothing 
made Bringman think it was highly probable that he did not know what the question was asking. 
He answered the question based upon his experience in being constn1ctively discharged from 
Alhertsons, and did so with a great deal of certainty, having this unusual course of events fresh in 
his mind. If there was any failure to accurately represent the conditions of his termination, such 
failure was accidental and a result of the inability of a claimant to interpret how the Dr.;)partment's 
three questionnaire choices mean "constructively discharged'\ "quif', "separated'\ "laid off", 
"tcrrnjnated" or some combination of those all at once. Because the willfulness required under 
MEMORANDUM IN s UPPORT OF NOTJCE OF APPEAL - Page 10 
~ 
04/30/2012 MON 15:07 [TX/RX NO 7130] @011 
04/30/2012 15:00 208424 4 CAPITOL LAl,o,I 
, Ip PAGE 12/14 
ldaho Code § 17~1366(12) does not include accidental omissions due to "negligence, 
misundefstanding or other cause", Bdngman's application could not have been a wlllfuJ 
misrepresentation. Because Bringman selected the "laid off' option in good faith and without 
reservation, fu.Jly understanding the question and believing his answer to best define the 
circumstances of his termination, his selection was not a willful false statement or willful failure 
to report a material fact. 
22. In January of 2012, the Department contacted Bringman regarding his benefits. 
During that conversation, Bringman agab accurately and in good faith conveyed the 
circumstances surrounding his termination and his application for benefits to the Department's 
representative. If Bringman had intended to wiJl:fulJy misrepresent his reason for leaving his 
employment, it would be most unusual for him to misrepresent this fact on the online 
questionnaire, only to spill the truth to the Department verbally shortly thereafter. Further, this 
was the second instance in which Albertsons had the opportunity to review and Bringman's 
claim for unemployment compensat1on. It remains a mystery why Albertsons did not contact the 
Department regarding its objection to his claim the first time he submitted it 
III. The Fifth and .Fourteenth Amendments. 
23. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution prohibit 
seizure of property without prior notice and hearing. Prior to losing his unemployment bei1efits, 
the Department afforded Brl11gman no such notice or hearing, and has suspended Bringman's 
right to receive benefits subject to him overcoming the burden of pi-oof in his own defense by 
"clear and convincing evidence" according to Idaho Code ~ 72-1361 _ Depriving Bringman of 
his benefits without notice or hearing and subsequently placing on him the burden of proof to 
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show that he is entitled to his benefits arc in clear contravention of his due process rights as set 
forth by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
CONCLUSION 
24. For all the foregoing reasons, the Decision of Appeals Examiner asserting that 
Bringman quit his job without good cause, and therefore was not in compliance with the 
conditions for eligibflity under Idaho Code Section 17-1366, should be reversed. For all the 
foregoing reasons, the Decision of Appeals Examiner asserting that Bringman did not provide 
accurate separation information as required by Idaho Code Section 17-1366 in an attempt to 
obtain benefits to which he was not enthled should be reversed. 
DATED this~ day of April) 2012. 
CAPITOL LAW GROUP, PLLC 
By: ________ -22-2_·· --··----
C. Tom Arkoosh, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Billy J_ Bringman 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the .J.> day of April, 2012, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document on the person(s) listed bel.ow, in the manner indicated: 
Idaho Department of Labor 
Appeals Bureau 
317 W. Main St. 
Boise, ID 83735 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Overnight Courier 
Hand De Ii vered 
_J£"' Facsimile 332-7558 
C. Tom Arkoosh 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BILLY J. BRINGMAN, 
SSN: 
Claimant, 
v. 
NEW ALBERTSONS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. 
IDOL# 2865-2012 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Appeal of a Decision issued by an Idaho Department of Labor Appeals Examiner denying 
Claimant unemployment insurance benefits. REVERSED in part; AFFIRMED in part. 
Claimant, Billy J. Bringman, through counsel, appeals a Decision issued by the Idaho 
Department of Labor ("IDOL" or "Department") finding him ineligible for unemployment 
insurance benefits. The Appeals Examiner found that: 1) Claimant voluntarily quit his job 
without good cause connected with the employment; 2) Employer's account is not chargeable for 
experience rating purposes; 3) Claimant willfully made a false statement or willfully failed to 
report a material fact in order to obtain unemployment benefits; and 4) Claimant is not entitled to 
a waiver of the overpayment. Claimant, Employer and IDOL participated in the hearing. Due 
process was adequately served. 
On April 5, 2012, Claimant requested the opportunity to submit a brief. The Commission 
granted that request and issued a briefing schedule by Order dated April 20, 2012. Claimant was 
the only party to submit a brief. (Claimant's Brief, filed April 30, 2012). The arguments 
contained in Claimant's brief will be considered and given appropriate weight. 
DECISION AND ORDER - 1 
In his brief, Claimant argues that he has a property right in his benefits and those benefits 
were denied without notice or hearing. (Claimant's Brief). Therefore, Claimant asserts a due 
process issue. That issue is addressed below. 
The undersigned Commissioners have conducted a de nova review of the record pursuant 
to Idaho Code§ 72-1368(7). Spruell v. Allied Meadows Corp., 117 Idaho 277, 279, 787 P.2d 
263, 265 (1990). The Commission has relied on the audio recording of the hearing before the 
Appeals Examiner conducted on March 12, 2012, along with the Exhibits [1 through 3; 3-A; 4 
through 16] admitted into the record during that proceeding. 
DUE PROCESS 
Claimant asserts that his property right in his unemployment benefits was denied without 
notice or hearing. (Claimant's Brief). However, the record shows that Claimant was afforded 
adequate notice and a hearing regarding the denial of his unemployment insurance benefits. 
"The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful 
time and in a meaningful manner."' Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (internal 
quotation omitted); Accord Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork, 145 Idaho at 127, 176 P.3d at 
132. Due process requires notice and, in some cases, an evidentiary hearing. Id. 
In accordance with Idaho Code § 72-1368(5) and IDAPA 09.01.06.026, IDOL provided 
Claimant with notice of the issues which denied his benefits and offered Claimant the 
opportunity for a hearing before an IDOL appeals examiner. (Exhibit 1). Claimant took 
advantage of that opportunity and participated in the hearing on March 12, 2012. (Audio 
recording). The Idaho Supreme Court recently held that a party's due process rights were 
satisfied by the initial IDOL hearing. Hopkins v. Pneumotech Inc., 152 Idaho 611, _, P.3d 
1242, 1246 (2012). Claimant received adequate due process. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
Based on the evidence in the record, the Commission concurs with and adopts the 
Findings of Fact as set forth in the Appeals Examiner's Decision with the following additions. 
1. The write-up noted Claimant's "continued display of poor leadership skills" and warned 
if "after the date of this letter you continue to exhibit poor judgment and poor leadership 
skills as determined by management, you will be immediately demoted or terminated at 
management discretion." 
2. According to Employer's cashier policy, employees are to "Verify ID on all personal 
check system prompts ... " The policy further states "Compliance to the procedures 
outline [in the policy] is imperative. Associates may not, based upon perceptions of 
ability to pay or any other reason deviate from the stated company policy." 
DISCUSSION 
Quit 
Claimant worked for Employer from May 12, 2004 through December 4, 2010. (Audio 
recording; Exhibit 7, p. 3). At the time of separation, Claimant was an Assistant Store Director. 
Employer asserts that Claimant had ongoing and perpetual problems with leadership. In October 
of 2012, Claimant refused to accept a check from a longtime customer. Employer contends that 
Claimant mishandled the situation and subsequently issued Claimant a write-up for the incident. 
(Audio recording). The write-up noted Claimant's "continued display of poor leadership skills" 
and warned if "after the date of this letter you continue to exhibit poor judgment and poor 
leadership skills as determined by management, you will be immediately demoted or terminated 
at management discretion." (Exhibit 12, p. 6). Claimant refused to sign the write-up. Employer 
subsequently sent Claimant home for approximately three weeks. (Audio recording). 
After Claimant received the write-up, Employer contends that Claimant's conduct for 
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which he was warned of in the write-up continued. As a result, Employer contacted Claimant to 
meet with the Vice President of Human Resources, Shane Wright. At the meeting, Claimant was 
offered two employment options: either resign with a severance package and the possibility of 
rehire in six (6) months or accept a demotion to fourth key position person. Claimant was 
instructed to take the weekend to think about the choices. Claimant chose to resign because it 
offered the best options for future employment and because the demotion was not suitable 
employment. (Audio recording). 
Employer maintains that Claimant quit. However, Claimant contends that he was 
constructively discharged because Employer forced him to quit. Pursuant to the Idaho 
Employment Security law, in cases where the parties dispute whether the claimant voluntarily 
quit or was discharged, the legal test is whether there are sufficient words or actions by an 
employer to logically lead a prudent employee to believe that his or her employment has been 
terminated. Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation District, 98 Idaho 330, 334-335, 583 P. 2d 54, 58-59 
(1977). Claimant bears the initial burden of showing that he was discharged. "Only if the 
claimant proves discharge does the employer have the burden of proving misconduct." Johnson 
v. Idaho Central Credit Union, 127 Idaho 867, 869, 908 P.2d 560, 562 (1995). 
Claimant failed to sufficiently show words or actions by Employer that would logically 
lead a prudent employee to believe that his or her employment was terminated. Employer 
offered Claimant the option of leaving his job with a severance package or continued 
employment. (Audio recording; Exhibit· 7, p. 4). Although Claimant may not have liked the 
choices, he was, nonetheless, offered the option of continuing work and preserving the 
employment relationship. Claimant testified that he chose to leave his employment and take the 
severance package because he felt it placed him in the best position for future employment. 
(Audio recording). Therefore, Claimant chose to leave his job instead of continuing employment 
with Employer. Claimant was the separating party in this matter. 
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In accordance with the Idaho Employment Security law, Claimant voluntarily left his 
employment rather than continue the employment relationship. Claimant quit. The analysis 
continues to determine whether he did so for good cause connected with the employment. 
Idaho Code § 72-1366(5) provides, in pertinent part, that a claimant is eligible for 
unemployment insurance benefits if he or she left his employment voluntarily with good cause 
connected with the employment. If a claimant voluntarily quits, the claimant bears the burden of 
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that s/he quit for "good cause." Edwards v. 
Independence Serv., Inc., 140 Idaho 912, 915, 104 P.3d 954, 957 (2004). "A preponderance of 
the evidence is evidence that, when weighed with that opposed to it, has more convincing force 
and from which a greater probability of truth results." Id. at 916, 104 P.3d at 958. 
What constitutes "good cause" for quitting employment is defined both by the Idaho 
Supreme Court and in the Idaho Administrative Code. IDAPA 09.01.30.450.03 provides that 
"good cause" is established when the claimant demonstrates that his or her real, substantial, and 
compelling circumstances would have forced a "reasonable person" to quit. "Good cause" must 
be connected with employment, and the reason for leaving must arise from the working 
conditions, job tasks, or employment agreement. IDAPA 09.01.30.450.02. Further, when an 
employee has viable options available, voluntary termination without exploring those options 
does not constitute good cause for obtaining unemployment compensation. Higgins v. Larry 
Miller Subaru-Mitsubishi, 145 Idaho 1, 4-5, 175 P.3d 163, 166-167 (2007). 
Claimant chose to quit his job when presented with only two options by Employer: 1) 
resign, or 2) accept a demotion to fourth key position. (Audio recording; Exhibit 7, p. 3). 
Retaining his position as an Assistant Store Manager was not an option. Claimant chose to 
resign because the demotion was not suitable employment and Claimant felt quitting was the best 
option regarding his future employment. (Audio recording). 
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Although Claimant's personal and subjective feelings regarding the preservation of his 
future employment does not constitute good cause for leaving his employment, the record 
contains sufficient evidence that the continued employment offered by Employer was not suitable 
for Claimant. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that quitting work that is not suitable is always 
good cause for leaving employment. Clay v. BMC West Truss Plant, 127 Idaho 501, 504, 903 
P.2d 90, 93 (1995). Further, an employee has good cause to quit his employment "when the 
conditions [are] unsuitable when compared to the conditions of the job as originally offered." 
Clay v. Crooks Industries, 96 Idaho 378, 379, 529 P.2d 774, 775 (1974). A wage reduction can 
constitute a substantial adverse change in conditions giving a claimant good cause to leave 
employment. Kyle v. Beco Corp., 109 Idaho 267, 269, 707 P.2d 378, 380 (1985). 
At the time Claimant left his job, he faced an imminent and substantial wage reduction. 
His former position as an assistant manager was no longer available. The offered demotion 
reduced his yearly wages by at least $20,000. Furthermore, the fourth key position was not 
salaried, as was the assistant manager position, but was paid by the hour. Claimant testified that 
he may not receive many hours with the demotion. (Audio recording). 
Although Employer contends that the exact terms of the demotion were not discussed, 
Mr. Wright did not contest the significant wage reduction or Claimant's concerns about the 
number of hours available. (Audio recording). Therefore, since the reduction in Claimant's 
wage was substantial, the job was not suitable for Claimant. 
It is not lost on the Commission that Employer's reason for demoting Claimant was due 
to Claimant's alleged failure to follow Employer's procedures and policies and for displaying 
continued leadership issues. We do not wish to foster the impression that an employer is not 
allowed to discipline an employee as it sees fit. However, in this case, the record lacks evidence 
to support Employer's reason for the demotion, thereby making the demotion more akin to a 
unilateral change in the terms of the employment agreement. 
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It i's undisputed that Claimant received a write up after a customer complained. The 
customer attempted to pay with a check; however, she did not have proper identification. (Audio 
recording). Employer's computer system required that ID must be shown to complete the 
transaction. According to Employer's policy, employees are to "Verify ID on all personal check 
system prompts ... " The policy further states "Compliance to the procedures outlined [in the 
policy] is imperative. Associates may not, based upon perceptions of ability to pay or any other 
reason deviate from the stated company policy." (Exhibit 12, p. 7). Since the customer did not 
have identification, Claimant declined to accept the check. Claimant testified that he calmly 
explained the situation to the customer, but the customer became irate. (Audio recording). 
Employer did not offer any first hand evidence to dispute Claimant's testimony. 
The customer apparently notified Employer about the incident and Employer issued 
Claimant a write-up. The write-up instructed Claimant to follow Employer's policy and 
procedure and noted Claimant displayed poor leadership skills during the incident. (Exhibit 7, p. 5). 
The record lacks any evidence of Claimant's "poor leadership skills" and Employer did not 
elaborate during the hearing. Based on this record, Claimant acted in accordance with 
Employer's policy and there is no evidence that he exhibited "poor leadership skills." 
Claimant further testified that, after receiving the write-up, he was suspended for three 
weeks and did not work. Thereafter, he met with Mr. Wright and, at that time, was offered the 
demotion. While Mr. Wright contends that the demotion was in response to continued leadership 
problems displayed by Claimant after the write-up, Mr. Wright does not have personal 
knowledge that Claimant returned to work after the incident. Rather, Mr. Write only talked with 
a co-worker who stated Claimant had returned to work. (Audio recording). Claimant's first 
hand testimony carries greater weight than Mr. Wright's hearsay testimony. Therefore, this 
record lacks sufficient evidence of Claimant's poor leadership skills that led to the offer of a 
demotion. In other words, the record lacks competent evidence that Employer's offer of the 
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demotion was due to Claimant's conduct. Therefore, Employer's offer of a demotion is more 
akin to a unilateral change in employment and the offer of continued employment, as analyzed 
above, was not suitable. 
Employer's offer of continued employment at a substantially lower wage was not suitable 
work for Claimant under the facts contained in this record. This reason constituted good cause to 
voluntarily leave his employment. 
Even though Claimant's reason constituted good cause to quit, Claimant must also 
establish that he explored viable options prior to quitting. Claimant testified that he talked with 
Mr. Wright and his supervisor about the check incident and to explain his circumstances, 
however those attempts were futile. He also expressed his dissatisfaction with the demotion to 
Mr. Wright. However, Claimant was presented with only two options: either resign or be 
demoted. (Audio recording). There is no indication in this record that any other available options 
existed for Claimant. Claimant is eligible for benefits. 
Chargeability 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-1351(2)(a), an employer's experience rated account is 
chargeable for benefits paid to a claimant who is discharged for reasons other than misconduct 
connected with employment or quits with good cause connected with employment. Employer 
paid the most wages to Claimant during the last four base quarters. (Exhibit 14). Since Claimant 
voluntarily left his employment for good cause connected with the employment, Employer's 
account is chargeable for experience rating purposes. 
Willful Failure to Report Material Facts 
When Claimant filed for benefits effective December 5, 2010 and December 12, 2011, 
Claimant reported his separation from Employer was cause by a "Layoff due to lack of work." 
(Exhibits 3 & 3-A). However, IDOL determined that Claimant was not laid off due to lack of 
work and that Claimant willfully made a false statement in order to obtain unemployment 
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insurance benefits. (Exhibit 9). Claimant disagrees. 
Idaho Code § 72-1366(12) provides that a claimant is ineligible for unemployment 
insurance benefits if it is determined that he or she willfully made a false statement or failed to 
report a material fact to IDOL. Furthermore, Idaho Code § 72-1366(12) also disqualifies a 
claimant for a period of fifty-two (52) weeks to any benefits he or she may otherwise be entitled to 
in the future. A claimant has the burden of proving his/her eligibility for benefits by a 
preponderance of the evidence whenever the claim is questioned. Guillard v. Department of 
Employment, 100 Idaho 647, 653, 603 P.2d 981, 987 (1979). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that a claimant who fails to accurately report the 
reason for his separation can be found to have willfully made a false statement under Idaho Code 
§72-1366(12). Current v. Haddon Fencing, 152 Idaho 10, 266 P.3d 485 (2011). Claimant does 
not dispute that he reported "Layoff due to lack of work" from Employer when he filed for 
benefits. Nor does Claimant dispute that when he filed for benefits on December 8, 2010 and 
again on December 12, 2011, he did so for the purpose of obtaining benefits. (Audio recording; 
Exhibits 3, p. 1 & 3-A, p. 1). Rather, Claimant contends that any failure to accurately report on his 
claims was not done willfully. (Audio recording). Therefore, the crux of this matter is 
determining whether Claimant's false statement was willful. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has defined "willful" as follows: 
"(Willfully) implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or make 
the omission referred to. It does not require any intent to violate law, in the sense 
of having an evil or corrupt motive or intent. It does imply a conscious wrong, 
and may be distinguished from an act maliciously or corruptly done, in that it 
does not necessarily imply an evil mind, but is more nearly synonymous with 
'intentionally,' 'designedly,' 'without lawful excuse,' and therefore not 
accidental." 
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Meyer, at 761, 589 P.3d at 96. The Court has also held that it is sufficient to find a 
claimant's actions willful when the Department made the claimant aware of the reporting 
requirements, but the claimant nonetheless failed to follow those regulations. In Gaehring v. 
Department of Employment, 100 Idaho 118, 594 P.2d 628 (1979), the Court affirmed the 
Commission's determination that the claimant willfully failed to report his earnings based on 
evidence that the claimant was aware of the regulations regarding unemployment insurance but 
did not follow those regulations when reporting. Gaehring, 100 Idaho at 119, 594 P.2d at 629. 
During the claim filing process, Claimant was required to watch a slide show and review 
the Unemployment Insurance Claimant Rights, Responsibilities and Filing Instructions pamphlet 
("pamphlet.") (Audio recording; Exhibit 2-B). The slide show specifically informed Claimant 
that the information he provided must be accurate and expressly stated fraud included making 
false statements such as reporting a claimant was laid off when the claimant quit. During the 
slide show, Claimant was also informed that he was responsible for knowing the information 
found in the pamphlet. (Audio recording). The pamphlet reiterated that fraud included "Failing 
to notify the Idaho Department of Labor when you quit or are discharged from work ... " (Exhibit 
2-B, p. 15). The pamphlet also instructed Claimant that if "there is anything you do not 
understand, ask your local office." (Exhibit 2-B, p. 3). It provided phone numbers for all of 
IDOL's local offices. (Exhibit 2-B, p. 17). Therefore, Claimant was adequately warned that he 
must accurately report his separation when he filed his claim. 
Claimant asserts that he picked the best option from the drop down menu provided on the 
claim filing system when asked for the reason that he left his employment. Claimant asserts that 
he was laid off due to a lack of suitable employment. However, since the drop down menu only 
allowed Claimant to choose "quit," "discharge," and "laid off due to lack of work," Claimant felt 
that the "laid off due to lack of work" was the best option. (Audio recording). 
When reviewing a claimant's testimony explaining his or her failure to accurately report 
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on a claim, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated that "The fact finder may consider the claimant's 
explanation unworthy of belief." Meyer, at 762, P.2d at 97. Based on the evidence in the record, 
such is the case here. Claimant testified that he did not believe he quit his employment. 
However, Claimant agreed that he was presented with the option of either continuing his 
employment or not. (Audio recording). The decision to separate his employment relationship 
was solely Claimant's. Claimant chose to leave his employment even though additional work 
was available. A reasonable individual would most likely find that they quit their employment in 
that situation. 
However, even if we were to find that Claimant did not believe he quit his job, the record 
shows that Claimant understood that none of the options offered on the claim filing system, 
including the option he chose, fit his situation. However, despite that understanding, and 
knowing from the instructions provided by the claim filing system that he must provide accurate 
information, Claimant never contacted the department for clarification on how to accurately 
report his situation. Claimant stated he did not choose "quit" or "discharge" because he did not 
believe that either option applied to his situation. However, Claimant also acknowledged that he 
was not "laid off due to lack of work." When asked if continuing work was available, Claimant 
agreed. (Audio recording). Therefore, applying Claimant's logic, none of the options accurately 
characterized the nature of his separation. 
Claimant knew the option he chose was not accurate. However, Claimant admits that he 
never contacted the Department for clarification on which option he was to choose. (Audio 
recording; Exhibit 6, p. 3). The Idaho Supreme Court has concluded that when a "claimant knew 
what information IDCL [IDOL] solicited, but nevertheless deliberately chose to respond without 
pursuing clarification ordinarily supports a finding of willful falsehood or concealment." Cox v. 
Hollow Leg Pub and Brewery, 144 Idaho 154, 158, 58 P.3d 930, 934 (2007), citing Meyer, at 
762, 589 P.2d at 97 (1979). 
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Individuals filing claims for unemployment benefits do make inadvertent errors that do 
not stem from any malicious intent. However, in this case, IDOL provided Claimant with 
adequate information that he must provide accurate separation information when he filed his 
claim and to contact the Department if he had questions. Despite knowing that he was not "laid 
off due to lack of work," Claimant nonetheless picked that option without seeking any 
clarification as he was instructed to do. Claimant's failure to accurately report his separation 
information constitutes a disregard of his obligation to report this information as accurately as 
possible. Therefore, Claimant's behavior during the relevant weeks was the type Idaho Code § 
72-1366(12) was intended to discourage. Claimant is ineligible for waiting week credit and 
benefits for the weeks effective December 5, 2010 through December 3, 2011 and December 11, 
2011 through January 14, 2012 as well as the fifty-two (52) week disqualification period 
effective February 5, 2012 through February 2, 2013. 
Waiver 
The Appeals Examiner also concluded that Claimant is ineligible for a waiver and must 
repay the benefits he received, but to which he was not entitled. Claimant received his benefits 
from the State of Idaho. (Exhibit 10). Idaho Code provides that the requirement to repay an 
overpayment, other than one resulting from a false statement, misrepresentation, or failure to 
report a material fact by the claimant, can be waived. However, the claimant must demonstrate 
that 1) the benefit payments were made solely as a result of department error and made to a 
claimant who could not reasonably have been expected to recognize the error; or 2) the benefit 
payment was a result of an employer misrepresenting wages earned and the claimant could not 
reasonably have been expected to recognize the error. Idaho Code§ 72-1369(5) (2011). 
Claimant received benefits for the weeks at issue because he did not disclose all of the 
material information relevant to determining his eligibility. In particular, Claimant received 
benefits because he failed to accurately report the reason for his separation from Employer. As 
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concluded above, Claimant's false statement was willful. Idaho Code § 72-1369(5) specifically 
excludes from eligibility for a waiver those claimants whose overpayment resulted from a false 
statement, misrepresentation, or failure to report a material fact. Because Claimant received 
unemployment benefits in violation of § 72-1366(12), he is ineligible for a waiver and must 
repay the benefits he received, but to which he was not entitled, as well as the applicable 
penalties assessed in accordance with Idaho Code§ 72-1369(2). 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I 
Claimant voluntarily quit his job with good cause connected to the employment. 
II 
Employer's account is chargeable for experience rating purposes. 
III 
Claimant willfully made a false statement or willfully failed to report a material fact for 
the purpose of obtaining unemployment benefits and is ineligible for waiting week credit and 
unemployment insurance benefits effective December 5, 2010 through December 3, 2011 and 
December 11, 2011 through January 14, 2012, as well as the fifty-two (52) week period effective 
February 5, 2012 through February 2, 2013. 
III 
Claimant is not entitled to a waiver of the overpayment and must repay benefits that he 
received, but to which he was not entitled. 
IV 
Claimant is subject to the associated penalty pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-1369(2). 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Decision of the Appeals Examiner is REVERSED as 
to the issue of separation and chargeability and AFFIRMED on all other issues. Claimant 
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voluntarily quit his job with good cause connected to the employment. Employer's account is 
chargeable for experience rating purposes. Claimant willfully made a false statement or willfully 
failed to report a material fact for the purpose of obtaining unemployment benefits and is 
ineligible for waiting week credit and unemployment insurance benefits effective December 5, 
2010 through December 3, 2011 and December 11, 2011 through January 14, 2012, as well as 
the fifty-two (52) week period effective February 5, 2012 through February 2, 2013. Claimant is 
not entitled to a waiver of the overpayment and must repay benefits that he received, but to 
which he was not entitled. Claimant is subject to the associated penalty pursuant to Idaho Code § 
72-1369(2). This is a final order under Idaho Code § 72-1368(7). 
DA TED this(fi;laay olJJ7 ~ , 2012. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
R.D. Maynard, Commissioner 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, NEW ALBERTSONS INC, AND THE 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, AND THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellant, Billy J. Bringman, appeals against the above named 
respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Decision and Order entered in the above entitled 
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action on the 9th day of July, 2012, the Idaho Industrial Commission Chairman Thomas E. 
Limbaugh, presiding. 
2. That the pa1iy has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or 
orders described in paragraph l above are appealab!e orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 ( d) I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal are: 
(a) Whether the Industrial Commission erred m simultaneously finding 
constructive discharge and ordering return of the award. 
(b) Whether the Industrial Commission erred in finding Appellant willfully made 
a material false statement or willfully failed to report a material fact in order to 
obtain unemployment benefit. 
( c) Whether the Industrial Commission erred in finding Appellant not entitled to 
a waiver under the circumstances of this case. 
(d) Whether the Industrial Commission erred in finding the Commission made 
the Appellant aware of the reporting requirements. 
( e) Whether the Industrial Commission erred in finding, under the circumstances, 
Appellant made an inaccurate statement. 
(f) Whether the Industrial Commission erred in finding the Appellant's 
explanation unworthy of belief when the Industrial Commission failed to provide 
"accurate" options but instead provided options that did not reflect reasons for 
leaving work described in statutory language. 
(g) Whether the Industrial Commission erred in finding the decision to separate 
from Appellant's employment relationship was solely Appellants, while 
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simultaneously finding that Appellant's employer constructively discharged 
Appellant. 
(h) Whether the Industrial Commission erred in finding the Appellant had an 
affirmative duty to contact the Industrial Commission to assure the Industrial 
Commission clarify its forms to more accurately reflect his circumstance; or, is 
Appellant's duty to provide the most accurate information allowed. 
(i) Whether the Industrial Commission erred in finding the Appellant had an 
affirmative duty to investigate the state's employment law and determine whether the 
information options provided by the Industrial Commission were in fact accurate. 
U) Whether the Industrial Commission erred in finding that Appellant was not 
entitled to waiver because Appellant should have recognized the Commission's effor 
in the Commissions information retrieval system. 
(k) Whether the Industrial Commission erred in finding Appellant received 
benefits because of material false statements rather than receive benefits because he 
was entitled to benefits because Appellant was constructively discharged. 
(1) The Appellant reserves the right to present other issues on appeal. 
4. No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. 
5. An Agency's transcript is requested. 
6. Appellant requests the contents of the Agency's record contain the standard 
documents as outlined in Idaho Appellate Rule 28(b)(3), in addition to the following: 
(a) The Appellant requests the audio recording of the hearing before the Appeals 
Examiner conducted on March 12, 2012, along with the Exhibits [l through 3; 3-A; 4 
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through 16] admitted into the recording during that proceeding, to be copied and sent 
to the Supreme Court. 
(b) Claimant's Brief, filed April 30, 2012. 
7. The appeal is taken upon matters of law. 
8. I certify the following: 
(a) A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Commission 
Secretary. 
(b) The Appellant has paid the appellate filing fee pursuant to I.A.R. 23(a)(3). 
(c) The Appellant has paid the administrative agency the estimated fee for 
preparation of the Agency's record and transcript. 
(d) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
I.A.R. 20 and the Attorney General of the State of Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 67-1401(1). 
DA TED this j!iJ day of August, 2012. 
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CERTIFICATION OF RECORD 
I, Jessica Solis, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial 
Commission, do hereby certify that the foregoing record contains true and correct copies of all 
pleadings, documents, and papers designated to be included in the Agency's Record Supreme 
Court No. 40232 on appeal by Rule 28(b )(3) of the Idaho Appellate Rules and by the Notice of 
Appeal, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 28(b). 
I further certify that all exhibits admitted in this proceeding are correctly listed in the List 
of Exhibits (i). Said exhibits will be lodged with the Supreme Court after the Record is settled. 
DATED this 4th day of September, 2012. 
BS'JFR!'.fXbG~~~ISSION 
<:~_ 
Jessi ea A. So is J. .fi 
Assistant: f:ormnissiQti',,:·Secretary 
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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BILLY J. BRINGMAN, 
Claimant/ Appellant, SUPREME COURT NO. 40232 
v. 
NEW ALBERTSONS, INC., NOTICE OF COMPLETION 
Employer/Respondent, 
and 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR/Respondent. 
TO: STEPHEN W. KENYON, CLERK OF THE COURTS; AND 
C. TOM ARKOOSH, ESQ., FOR CLAIMANT BILLY J BRINGMAN; AND 
NEW ALBERTSONS, INC. PRO SE FOR EMPLOYER/RESPONDENT; AND 
TRACEY K. ROLFSEN, ESQ., FOR IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR/RESPONDENT. 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Agency's Record was completed on this date, 
and, pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been 
served by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following: 
TOM C. ARKOOSH 
250 N lOTH STREET, 4TH FLOOR 
POBOX2598 
BOISE ID 83701-2598 
NEW ALBERTSONS, INC., PRO SE 
C/O TALX UC EXPRESS 
Did not participate at l/C level. 
No record will be provided 
TRACEY K. ROLFSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
317 W. MAIN STREET 
BOISE, ID 83735 
You are further notified that, pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, all 
parties have twenty-eight days from this date in which to file objections to the Record, 
NOTICE OF COMPLETION - 1 
including requests for corrections, additions or deletions. In the event no objections to the 
Agency's Record are filed within the twenty-eight day period, the March 12, 2012 Transcript 
and Record shall be deemed settled. 
DATED at Boise, Idaho this ___ day of __,..,..'-"'-'I'"--" 
~. USTRIAL COMMl~ION 
;g , A~ ~~@ > 
Jessica A Solis 
Assistant Commission Secretary 
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